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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from the final agency action 
in formal proceedings of the Labor Commission under the Administrative Procedures Act 
and Chapter 4 of the Judiciary and Judicial Administration Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63G-4-403 (1); 78A-4-102(2)(a) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Respondents Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Workers Compensation Fund 
(hereinafter, collectively, "WCF") agree with the Statement of the Issues in the Brief of 
Petitioner Nancy M. Wood (hereinafter "Wood's Brief) except that WCF disagrees that 
there is any need for this court to consider the Labor Commission's interpretation of the 
relevant statute, which this court has already done in a previous appeal in this matter. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
The "Mental Stress as an Occupational Disease" provision, Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-3-106 (2005), is set forth verbatim in Wood's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
WCF agrees with the Statement of The Case in Wood's Brief except for the 
following additions: 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
On February 9, 2009, Petitioner (hereinafter "Wood") timely filed a Motion 
(Request) for Reconsideration. (R. 210-17). 
c. Disposition at Agency. 
On April 28, 2009, the Appeals Board issued an Order Denying Reconsideration. 
(R. 223-25). 
d. Statement of Facts. 
On February 17, 1995, Wood did sustain a lumbar spine injury arising from an 
industrial accident at Respondent Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Respondent Workers 
Compensation Fund paid some benefits. But, in December, 2001, the parties entered into 
a Compromised Settlement of Claim of Disputed Validity, which was approved by the 
Labor Commission in an Order, dated December 18, 2001 (hereinafter, "Settlement 
Agreement and Order"). (R. 182-87). 
Specifically, the Settlement Agreement and Order provides that Wood 
"permanently releases [WCF] from any and all claims . . . arising out of the accident 
during the course and scope of [Wood's] employment for [Eastern Utah Broadcasting] on 
or about February 17, 1995." Moreover, the order provided that no other benefits would 
be paid and that the case was dismissed, with prejudice. (R. 183, 186). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although there are, admittedly, other facts that would support an opposite result, 
there was substantial evidence, particularly, the opinion of the impartial medical panel, 
which Wood never objected to, to support the Labor Commission's finding that Wood's 
mental stress was not predominantly caused by employment exposures at Eastern Utah 
Broadcasting. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING THAT WOOD'S MEDICAL CONDITION AS A 
RESULT OF MENTAL STRESS DID NOT ARISE 
PREDOMINANTLY FROM EMPLOYMENT 
In a previous opinion in this case, this court determined that to prevail on a 
mental stress occupational disease claim under Section 34A-2-106 of the Utah Code, "the 
claimant must show that the sum of all work related stress is greater than the sum of all 
non-work related stress." Eastern Utah Broadcasting v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 
App 99,11 9, 158 P.3d 1115, 1118 (hereinafter WoodII). Based upon this construction of 
Section 34A-1-106 in Wood'II, the Appeals Board found that Wood's work related stress 
was not predominant. There is substantial evidence to support this finding. 
Wood has properly marshalled the evidence in support of the Appeals Board 
finding; however, Wood is incorrect in her argument that such evidence was inadequate 
because the Appeals Board considered non-work exposures in its evaluation when, in 
fact, some of those exposures were at least partially work related. 
It is true that Wood had an industrial accident with the same employer in 1995 that 
caused injury to her lumbar spine and that the medical panel and the Appeals Board 
considered Wood's ongoing pain in her low back as a non-work contributor to her mental 
stress. But, due to Wood's release of all her claims related to her low back and, based 
upon that, the Labor Commission's dismissal of her low back claim, with prejudice, 
Wood is precluded from now claiming that her low back pain should be considered as 
3 
work related in her claim for occupational disease mental stress. This court so held in 
Acosta v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 2004 UT App 411 (hereinafter, "Acosta 
IF)} Thus, as a matter of law, Wood's low back injury is non-work related. 
In Acosta II, Ms. Acosta had first filed an Application for Hearing to recover 
workers compensation benefits for industrial accident for a low back injury she sustained 
while at work engaged in lifting an infant. The Labor Commission denied Ms. Acosta's 
claim because she had a preexisting low back condition which, although asymptomatic, 
contributed to her injury, and the lifting of the infant did not meet the higher legal 
causation standard set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
On appeal, this court affirmed the Labor Commission's denial of benefits, reasoning that 
even if the preexisting condition was asymptomatic, the legal causation test of Allen still 
applies. Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, Y|[ 20-27, 44 P.3d 819, 824-26 
(hereinafter Acosta I). 
After this court's decision in Acosta I, Ms. Acosta filed another Application for 
Hearing, claiming that her low back injury was the result of an occupational disease, in 
addition to being an industrial accident. The Labor Commission dismissed the case as 
precluded by res judicata. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal, applying the 
claim preclusion branch of res judicata, which "arises when (i) 'the same parties' (ii) 
present a claim that was or that 'could and should have been raised' in a previous suit, 
and (iii) the previous suit 'resulted in a final judgment.'" Acosta II, at •fl 2. This court 
1
 Since this decision is unpublished, it is included in the Addendum. Utah R. App. P. 
30(f). 
4 
affirmed the Labor Commission's dismissal, reasoning that Ms. Acosta5s occupational 
disease claim met all three criteria and, in particular, could and should have been brought 
when she filed the claim for industrial accident.2 Id., at \ 8. 
In this case, as in Acosta II, the industrial accident case and this case involve the 
same parties and there was a final judgment of dismissal of the industrial accident case, 
with prejudice. 
This case is different from Acosta II because Wood is not directly attempting to 
reopen her industrial accident case as an occupational disease, but the reasoning of 
Acosta II still applies because by now alleging that the lumbar pain was caused by the 
1995 industrial accident, Wood is indirectly attempting to circumvent her release of all 
claims related to that accident by alleging it contributed to her mental stress occupational 
disease. In Acosta II, this court reasoned that "claims are 'identical5 if the two causes of 
action rest on the same 'state of facts' and the same kind of evidence is '"necessary to 
sustain the two causes of action.'55" Id., at ^ 4 (quoting Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 
1340 (Utah 1983)). Here, the fact that the 1995 accident was originally an industrial 
accident is necessary to Wood's argument that the low back pain is non-work related. 
Since now, by virtue of the release and order of dismissal with prejudice, the low back 
The parties did not dispute that Ms. Acosta's claim met "the same parties and the final 
judgment requirements" of claim preclusion res judicata. Id. at ^ 3. 
Wood may argue that, since there was a settlement, there was never a final judgment 
"on the merits"; however, this case is different than a typical settlement of a civil suit in 
that the settlement was required to be, and was, approved by the Labor Commission 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(4) (2005). See, Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601,621 (Utah 1983). 
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pain is no longer industrial as a matter of law, Wood's argument that the low back pain is 
work related is contrary to the reasoning of Acosta II. 
Wood next argues that her headaches are also, at least partially, work related. 
Although Dr. Mooney does state that the headaches may be the result of stress, he does 
not specifically address the source of the stress when stating this. More importantly, Dr. 
Morgan's opinion is that the headaches are a result of the stress, not a cause of it. Wood 
admits that, except as it apparently relates to the viral meningitis that is she admits is non-
work related, the medical panel also does not consider the headaches, whatever the cause, 
as a cause of the mental stress. 
Wood next argues that her husband's disability and the fact that she had her son 
living with her should not be considered as causes of her mental stress because they are 
not mentioned in or supported by the medical record, only by the Administrative Law 
Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"), in her findings. Wood cites no specific legal authority for her 
proposition that the presence or absence of stressors can only be established by medical 
evidence. Anyone living in today's society is capable, without resort to a medical 
professional, of discerning that certain given circumstances can cause stress. Therefore, 
just because no medical professionals, including the medical panel, discussed these 
stressors it does not mean that the Appeals Board could not appropriately consider them. 
Moreover, even if medical evidence is necessary to establish a given stressor, as will be 
argued below, of the stressors the medical panel did consider, it still concluded that the 
work related stressors did not predominate over the non-work related stressors. 
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Wood argues that the Appeals Board could not appropriately rely upon the medical 
panel opinion because the medical panel did not consider whether the stressors arose 
from Wood's employment or not, only whether Wood's then current condition was 
attributable to work or non-work related exposures. As stated above, in Wood II, this 
court specifically held that "the claimant must show that the sum of all non-work related 
stress is greater than the sum of all non-work related stress." Wood II, at [^ 9. There is no 
mention of arise or when this comparison should be made. Wood is asking the court to 
engage in an exercise in semantics in any event. Moreover, if Wood believed that the 
medical panel considered the wrong point in time, or, as Wood also argued, considered 
work related stress as non-work related (e.g., low back pain), in its comparison, she could 
have objected to the medical panel report on that basis. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
601(2)(d) (Supp. 2009); (R. 55). Or, when the ALJ entered her Preliminary 
Determination of Permanent Total Disability and Order, wherein she adopted the 
conclusions of the medical panel to determine that 50% of Wood's disability was work-
related (R. 70, 73, 76), she could have filed a Motion for Review disputing that finding. 
Wood did neither and, under fundamental principles of appellate review, should not be 
now allowed to raise those protestations of error by the medical panel, ALJ or Appeals 
Board. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 9,17 P.3d 1122, 1124; hunt v. Lance, 
2008 UT App 192, ffif 23, 24 ,186 P.3d 978, 986; Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, % 
17, 38P.3d307, 313. 
Wood's next argument is that the opinion of Dr. Mooney does not support the 
Appeals Board decision. Admittedly, Dr. Mooney's report is somewhat equivocal. Even 
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so, his opinions, when taken in conjunction with the other substantial evidence the 
Appeals Board relied upon, does support the Appeals Board decision. Additionally, even 
if Dr. Mooney's report is entirely disregarded, the fact remains that the medical panel 
report unequivocally concludes that only half of Wood's mental stress is work-related. 
The standard of review does not require that this court do a balancing of the evidence, 
only determine whether there is "'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion/" Bradley v. Pay son 
City Corp., 2003 UT 16, \ 15, 70 P.3d 47, 52 (quoting First National Bank v. County 
Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)). Therefore, since the medical 
panel was the only impartial medical professionals to opine on the issue of the amount of 
work related stress as compared to non-work related stress, it is difficult to conceive of a 
more reasonable basis for the Appeals Board's conclusion. 
Since the medical panel report alone is substantial evidence to support the Appeals 
Board decision, it is superfluous for the court to consider the "other credible evidence" 
that Wood presents for consideration, no matter how compelling that evidence may be. 
To do so would circumvent the clear standard of review set forth above. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should affirm the Order on Remand 
from the Utah Court of Appeals, dated January 21, 2009. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 2009. 
Floyd $f Holm, Attorney for Petitioners 
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ADDENDUM 
11 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
A 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
NANCY WOOD, 1 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
EASTERN UTAH BROADCASTING and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 01-0208 
Nancy Wood asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior 
decision denying Mrs. Wood's claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, Title 
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 63G-4-302 of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
This matter arises from Mrs. Wood claim for occupational disease benefits for anxiety 
disorder allegedly caused by mental stress from her employment by Eastern Utah Broadcasting.] The 
Appeals Board previously determined that Ms. Wood's work-related stress does not predominate 
over her non-work stresses. For that reason, the Appeals Board concluded that Mrs. Wood's 
employment at Eastern Utah Broadcasting is the not the legal cause of her anxiety disorder and that 
she is not entitled to occupational disease benefits. 
Mrs. Wood now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Specifically, Mrs. Wood 
argues that the evidence establishes that her work-related stress did, in fact, predominate over her 
non-work stresses. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the argument raised in Mrs. Wood's request for reconsideration in light of 
the evidence of record, the Appeals Board remains convinced that Mrs. Wood's work-related stress 
did not predominate over her non-work stresses. The Appeals Board's previous decision discusses in 
some detail the factual basis for the Board's determination—particularly the opinion of the impartial 
medical panel. The Appeals Board therefore reaffirms its previous decision in this matter, 
- The legal and procedural history relating to Mrs. Wood's claim has been set forth in the previous 
decisions of the Appeals Board and the Utah Court of Appeals and will not be repeated here. 
\ ' * M \f^i 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
NANCY WOOD 
PAGE 2 OF 3 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board denies Mrs, Wood's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this „$ day of April, 2009. 
Colleen Colton, Chair 
"kjjU^J ^l0M^ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
DISSENT 
For the reasons stated in my dissent to the Appeals Board's majority decision of January 21, 
2009, I would grant Mrs. Wood's request for reconsideration and remand her claim to the 
administrative law judge for further evidentiary proceedings on the question of whether Mrs. Wood's 
work-related stress predominates over her personal non-work stresses. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
NANCY WOOD 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Reconsideration^in the matter of Nancy 
Wood, Case No. 01-0208, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this <£$ day of April, 2009, to the 
following: 
Nancy Wood 
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Bradford Myler, Esq. 
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Floyd Holm, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
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Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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(AND ORDER) 
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Floyd W Holm #1522 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NANCY M. WOOD 
File No/ 
Inj.Date; 
vs. 
1995-07141-L2 
02-17-95 
Petitioner 
EASTERN UTAH BROADCAST 
and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
COMPROMISED SETTLEMENT 
OF CLAIM OF DISPUTED 
VALIDITY 
Case #2001209 
Respondents 
Petitioner Nancy M. Wood (hereinafter "Petitioner") and Respondents Eastern Utah 
Broadcast (hereinafter "Employer") and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF7) 
hereby stipulate and agree that the above-referenced matter maybe compromised, settled and 
discharged pursuant to the following terms and conditions: 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner was involved in an industrial accident during the course and scope of 
her employment with Employer on February 17, 1995. Petitioner is currently 52 years of age, 
2. WCF was the workers compensation insurance carrier for Employer on February 17, 
1995. 
3. After an investigation into the facts surrounding the Petitioner's industnal 
accident, a dispute has arisen between Petitioner and Employer as to whether or not Petitioner i$ 
entitled to additional benefits under the Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Act 
87/83/2007 13:27 14dbbJ/3b±b 
of Utah, Section 34A-1401, et seq, Utah Code Annotated, The specifics of the dispute are set 
forth as follows: * • •> 
A. Petitioner alleges that while carrying mail iram'tJie post office to her place of 
employment she slipped and fell on a gravel road, injuring her lower back, 
B. Petitioner claims that due to the above-described injury she has sustained medical 
expenses and time lost from work. 
C. Respondents claim that they have already paid fall benefits m relation to Petitioner's 
accident on February 17,1995, that she has reached maximum improvement and 
that there are no additional reasonable and necessary medical expenses or disability 
as the result of such accident. 
D. Respondents further claim that Applicant's claims for medical expenses related to 
the accident may be barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations. 
E. Rather than continue the dispute the parties feel it in their best interests to enter 
into the following final and binding settlement. 
SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE 
Based upon the foregoing, the parties agree as follows: 
1. In consideration of the payment to Petitioner of the sums set forth in this 
document, Petitioner permanently releases Employer, and/or WCF from any and all claims and 
pursuant to the Workers7 Compensation and Occupational Disease Act of Utah arising out of the 
accident during the course and scope of Petitioner^ employment for Employer on or about 
February 17,1995. 
2. In exchange for the foregoing release, WCF agrees, on behalf of Employer5 s 
workers compensation policy, as follows: 
a. To pay a lump sum amount of $7750(100 (seven thousand five hundred 
dollars and no cents) directly to Petitioner, less $1,500.00 (one thousand five hundred and no 
cents) paid out in a separate check to Bradford D. Myler, Petitioner's attorney, for a net amount. 
paid to Petitioner of $6,000,00 (six thousand dollars and no cents). Said sum represents 
compensation at the rate of $3,49 per week for Petitioner's current life expectancy of 33.08 years. 
b. To be forever barred and estopped from in any way claiming that 
Petitioner's industrial accident of February 17, 1995 in any way caused or contributed to 
Petitioner's permanent total disability, if any. This settlement is for th<^g|^ related to the injury 
of February 17,1995. She still has an ongoing occupational disease cialnrwhich is not affected 
by the settlement.1' 
' if} * C • O 
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3. Petitioner declares that she understands that the injuries sustained may be 
permanent and progressive and that recovery thereirom iz uncertain and indefinite, hi making 
this release and agreement, the Petitioner relies wholly upon her own judynent, belief, and 
knowledge of the nature and extent and duration of said injuries or damages, and that she has not 
been influenced to any extent whatever in making this release by any representations or 
statements regarding said injuries, or regarding any othe: matters, made by the persons, firms, or 
corporations who are released or by any person or persons representing the released parties, or by 
any physician or surgeon employed by the released parties. 
4. It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a 
doubtful and disputed claim; that the issue in dispute is that of Petitioner's cooperation and the 
continued compensability of the Petitioner's injury under the provisions of the Workers' 
Compensation and Occupational Disease Act of Utah; and that the payments to be made by 
Employer hereunder are not to be construed in any way as an admission of liability for the 
payment of additional workers' compensation benefits on the part of Employer, by whom 
liability for such benefits is expressly denied. 
5. This release contains the entire agreement between the parties. The terms of this 
release are contractual and not a mere recital They are intended as a final and binding 
settlement, not subject to future modification or novation except upon subsequent written 
agreement between the parties. Petitioner further states that she has carefully read the foregoing 
release and knows the contents and after having conferred with legal counsel, signs the same of 
her own free act. In witness of the same, Petitioner has reviewed and signed the attached 
Disclosure Statement as required by the Labor Commission of Utah, 
The parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement becomes binding and effective upon 
approval of the Labor Commission of Utah. 
£ 
Dated this ft> day of T>fc&e**^» 2001 
Dated this \V ^day of 1 ) ^ £ * W £ A , 2001 
Dated this & day of /fecc^k-. 2001 
Dated this j$ day of kaAJUrUUs^ 2001 
Floyd i^fciolm, Attorney for 
Respondents ^ 
MJL< *d$ i 
ihda Duvall, Mediator 
Labor Commission 
0 7 / 0 3 / 2 0 0 7 1 3 : 2 / ± ^ 0 0 , 3 / 3 0 . 1 0 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. I understand that all unpaid medical bills will be paid by me and not by Employer 
and/or WCF and that the $7,500.00 (seven thousand five hundred dollars and no cents) lump sum 
settlement will be paid to me to cover future medical expeoses and any claims for disability 
compensation related to the accident of February 17, 1995. 
2. I understand that this a full and final settlement. 
3. I understand that this is all the money I will ever receive as the result of my 
industrial accident that occurred while working for Employer on or about February 17,1995. 
4. I understand that in accepting this settlement, I am giving up the right to an 
administrative hearing at the Labor Commission, in which an Administrative Law Judge could give 
mc more money, less money or no money. 
5. I understand that even if my current medical condition becomes more serious, or if I 
develop new medical problems from this condition in the future, I cannot come back and ask for 
more money. 
6. My decision to settle this case is my own. No one has placed any pressure on me or 
has influenced this decision, I am presently free from the influence of drugs or alcohol that could 
otherwise impair my judgment; in signing this settlement, 
7. It is my desire that the Administrative Law Judge approve this settlement. 
K I pm^x if) U 
I Petitiotier's Signature 
Date 
O&DER 
Based upon the foregoing Compromised Settlement of Chdm of Disputed Validity, is hereby 
ordered as follows: 
1. It is ordered that the claim for Workers Compensation and/or Occupational 
Disease benefits made by Nancy M. Wood against Eastern Utah Broadcast, for injuries caused by 
an industrial accident occurring on or about February 17,1995, be settled on a disputed validity 
basis. 
2. The Workers Compensation Fund, on behalf of Eastern Utah Broadcast is ordered 
as follows: 
a. To pay a lump sum amount of $7,500.00 (seven thousand five hundred 
dollars and no cents) directly to Petitioner, less $ 1,500,00 (one thousand five hundred and no 
cents) paid out in a separate check to Bradford D. Myler, Petitioner's attorney, for a net amount 
paid to Petitioner of $6,000.00 (six thousand dollars and no cents). Said sum represents 
compensation at the rate of S3.49 per week for Petitioner's current life expectancy of 33.08 years. 
h To be forever barred and estopped from in any way claiming that 
Petitioner's industrial accident of February 17,1995 in anyway caused or contributed to 
Petitioner's permanent total disability, if any. 
3. No other benefits shall be paid other than those set forth above, 
4. It is ordered that the Labor Commission ratifies this agreement to the extent that 
its jurisdiction allows. 
5. The case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Approved this / ^ day of / i T O K ^ O Q l 
by the Labor Commission of Utah. Juftge Debbie L^Hann 
Administrative Law Judge 
^L^ 
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MAILING CERTIFK ATE 
^ v ^ '£uLej^*J*> £*- N 
I hereby certify that on the p'l__ day of November, 2001,. a true and correct copy of Settlement of 
Disputed Validity regarding Nancy M Wood was mailed postage prepaid to the following 
parties: 
Floyd WHota _'Uv3Z^a*sb"^~'rK 
Attorney for Respondents 
Workers Compensation Fund 
..,/ 
^Bradford' Myler 
Attorney at Law 
1441 South 550 East 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Nancy M. Wood 
4476 East 2750 South 
Price, Utah 84501 
\V\ r Y V ^ V ^ ^ ^ ' 
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OPINION BY: Norman H. Jackson 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Original Proceeding in this Court. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
[^[1] Linda Acosta appeals because the 
Labor Commission (Commission) dismissed 
her occupational disease claim as 
precluded by res judicata. We affirm. 
[^ |2]The res judicata doctrine has two 
branches, one of which is claim prec-
lusion. See Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, 
Inc., 2000 UT 93, P19, 16 P. 3d 1214. 
"Generally, claim preclusion bars a 
party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully 
litigated previously." Massey v. Board 
of Trs. of the Ogden Area Cmty. Action 
Comm. , Inc., 2004 UT App 27, PS, 86 P. 3d 
120 (citing Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 6, P58, 44 P. 3d 663) (quotations 
and other citations omitted). Claim 
preclusion arises when (i) "the same 
parties" [*2] (ii) present a claim 
that was or that "could and should have 
been raised" in a previous suit, and 
(iii) the previous suit "resulted in a 
final judgment. " Miller, 2002 UT 6 at P58 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
tl3]The parties do not dispute that 
this case meets the same parties and the 
final judgment requirements. Thus, at 
issue here is whether the occupational 
disease claim was or could and should 
have been raised in a previous suit. We 
review the trial court's determination 
that res judicata bars an action for 
correctness. See Maoris, 2000 UT 93 at 
PI 7. 
[^4]First, Acosta argues that the 
workers' compensation claim was a 
distinct claim from the industrial 
accident claim because it arose from 
separate statutes with different re-
quirements and compensation. For res 
judicata purposes, though, claims are 
"identical" if the two causes of action 
rest on the same "state of facts" and the 
same kind of evidence " ' is necessary to 
sustain the two causes of action. ' " Id. 
at P28 (quoting Schaer v. State, 657 P. 2d 
1337, 1340 (Utah 1983)) . Acosta» s claims 
are the same in that they both involve an 
injury to her lower back, rely on the same 
medical [*3] records, and stem from the 
same employment. Additionally, both 
claims allege an injury that initially 
produced symptoms at the same time. The 
fact that Acosta now depends upon a 
different legal theory is unpersuasive. 
The "state of facts" and evidence un-
derlying the claim, not the legal bases, 
are relevant to the identity of the 
claim. Id. 
[^ 5] Second, Acosta argues that she 
could not have filed the claims together 
because the Commission used different 
forms for the two actions. However, a 
claimant may state alternative grounds 
for a claim. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 
18. Additionally, the administrative law 
judges of the Commission adjudicate all 
matters brought under the Utah Labor 
Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-1-302(1)(a) (2001). Thus, Acosta 
could have asserted the occupational 
disease claim as an alternative ground in 
the workers' compensation claim, and the 
claim would have been heard by the same 
administrative law judge who heard the 
workers' compensation claim. 
[^[6] Next, Acosta argues that (i) the 
Commission did not analyze the "should 
have" requirement; (ii) the governing 
acts, the Occupational Disease Act and 
the Workers' Compensation Act, [*4] do 
not require a claimant to bring claims 
simultaneously; and (iii) the Commis-
sion's practice of allowing alternative 
claims was permissive not mandatory. 
Thus, Acosta argues, she had no duty to 
bring the claims together. Contrary to 
Acosta's argument, the Commission did 
analyze the "should have" requirement. 
Even if the statutes do not require that 
claims be brought together, res judicata 
precludes a claimant from pursuing a 
claim "through piecemeal litigation, 
offering one legal theory to the court 
while holding others in reserve for 
future litigation." American Estate 
Mgmt. v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp., 
1999 UT App 232, P14, 986 P. 2d 765 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Thus, because the facts and evidence 
necessary to present and defend these 
claims substantially overlap, Acosta 
should have brought the claims together. 
\\l\ Lastly, Acosta argues that public 
policy requires the Commission to award 
compensation to her because the policy 
behind the Workers' Compensation Act 
should override a technical hurdle such 
as claim preclusion. While workers' 
compensation indeed serves important 
public interests, claim preclusion does 
also. See id. at P6. The important [*5] 
interests underlying claim preclusion 
should not be ignored. 
tf8]In sum, claim preclusion bars 
Acosta's occupational disease claim 
because the same parties present a claim 
that is identical, in fact and evidence, 
to a previous claim. Acosta could and 
should have brought the occupational 
disease claim together with the workers • 
compensation claim, and the previous 
claim resulted in a final judgment. Thus, 
the Commission correctly dismissed 
Acosta's occupational disease claim as 
barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 1 
1 In light of our decision to 
affirm the dismissal, we need not 
reach the argument of Respondent 
American Manufacturers Mutual 
Insurance that it did not insure 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center 
during the time in which Acosta was 
injured. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
